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Chinese gangs and extortion 
 
Before 1965, except for the "Tong Wars" among adult associations in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century (Dillon 1962; Gong and Grant 1930), Chinese communities in the 
United States had relatively low crime rates. Chinese people in general, and Chinese youths 
in particular, were viewed as law-abiding, hard-working, and peaceful (Beach 1932; MacGill 
1938). The most common crimes among Chinese immigrants were victimless offenses such 
as prostitution, opium smoking, drunkenness, and disorderly conduct (Tracy 1980). 
Offenders were primarily adult sojourners who indulged in these culturally sanctioned 
recreational activities as a respite from work. 
 The year 1965 was a turning point in the history of Chinese immigration. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 not only placed Chinese immigration on an 
equal footing with that of "preferred" nations, but also established priorities or "preferences" 
for admissions based largely on family relationships. These preferences permitted those 
Chinese immigrants already living in the United States to initiate documents for visas for 
their families overseas. As a result, immigrants of Chinese origins almost doubled each 
decade over the past 30 years (Zhou 1992). 
 With the growth of the Chinese population, a corresponding increase in the crime 
rates occurred in Chinese communities (President's Commission on Organized Crime 1984). 
Chinese gangs such as the Wah Ching, Joe Fong Boys, Ghost Shadows, Flying Dragons, 
Tung On, Fook Ching, Bamboo United, and Green Dragons became active in New York 
City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Boston, and Chicago. The gangs were alleged to be 
involved in gambling, extortion, prostitution, burglary, robbery, aliens smuggling, 
kidnapping, and violence (Bresler 1981; Chin 1990; Kinkead 1992; Posner 1988; US 
Department of Justice 1985, 1988; US Senate 1992). Gang shootouts erupted often within the 
communities, and innocent bystanders were being hurt or killed. 
 Extortion is reported by the media and law enforcement authorities to be one of the 
major activities of Chinese gangs (Kerber and Gentile 1982; Louttit 1982; Penn 1980; US 
Department of Justice 1985, 1988; US Senate 1992). Police estimate that more than 90 
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percent of Chinese business owners in New York City Manhattan's Chinatown regularly pay 
one or more gangs (Bresler 1981; Meskil 1989; Posner 1988). Businesses in Queens and 
Brooklyn Chinese communities also were found to be heavily victimized by members of 
Chinese gangs (US District Court 1991). When retail businesses refuse to pay, their shops 
may be vandalized, burglarized, or robbed. Less often, store owners have been beaten, shot 
at, or killed for refusing to comply with a gang's demands (Scilla and Locksley 1985; US 
District Court 1991). According to reports, Chinese business owners in San Francisco, 
Vancouver, and Toronto also have been extorted frequently by Chinese gangs (Dubro 1992; 
Lavigne 1991). 
 Prior research describes four types of gang extortion or victimization in the Chinese 
business community (Chin 1990). The first type, "protection," is a gang's demand for a fixed 
amount of money from a business owner to ensure that his or her business will not be 
disturbed by that gang or other gangs. The amount is negotiated between the owner and the 
gang member; the money then is paid regularly. The second type of victimization, 
"extortion," is the sporadic and spontaneous demand for money from business owners by 
gang members.1 The amount of payment is negotiated on each occasion, and the perpetrators 
do not promise to provide any service in return. In the third type of victimization, gang 
members sell items such as firecrackers and mooncakes to business owners at exorbitant 
prices. In the fourth type, gangs refuse to pay for food and services, or ask for heavy 
discounts. 
 With steady income from extortion, Chinese gangs are able to recruit new members. 
Through extortion, they express their firm control of certain territories. When two or more 
gangs claim control of a specific territory, store owners within that territory may have to pay 
more than one gang; in addition, street violence may erupt as a result of the power struggle 
between the competing gangs. Merchants are reported to be extorted heavily by the gangs, 
but law enforcement authorities are frustrated because few victims file complaints. As a 
result, Chinatown residents, especially Chinese business owners, allegedly are living in a 
"subculture of fear." 
 Although extortion activities targeted at businesses appear to be widespread in 
Chinese communities, no systematic data are available with which to validate claims about 
its prevalence, the dynamics and processes of extortion, or the severity and persistence of 
extortion-related problems. Most studies on the victims of crime have focused on children, 
women, the elderly, and the mentally retarded (Kaiser et al. 1991; Viano 1992). Because the 
phenomenon is relatively recent, few opportunities have arisen to develop theories for 
explaining the patterns of recurring victimization, to refine methods for study, or to 
accumulate empirical knowledge. Most information about Chinese gangs and their activities 
comes from the police and the media. Although some studies have analyzed data from a 
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small number of gang members or youths at risk (Chin 1990; Robinson and Joe 1980; Sung 
1977; Toy 1992), no research has addressed patterns of extortion based on data gathered from 
representative samples of gang members or their victims. 
 To examine the patterns of extortion2 by Chinese gangs, interviewers spoke with 
owners and managers of businesses in three Chinese neighborhoods in New York City. The 
interviews addressed the forms and patterns of gang exploitation of businesses, the social 
processes of victimization, the social and cultural meanings of extortion, and the business 
community's reactions to the gang problem. On the basis of data collected from the business 
community, this paper explores the seriousness of gang extortion in New York City's Chinese 
communities, the justifications for complying to gang demands, the reasons for resisting the 
gangs, the prevalence of reporting crime to law enforcement authorities among Chinese 
victims, the reasons why Chinese business people either approach or avoid the American 
criminal justice system, and the patterns of adaptation to gang victimization. 
 
 
 
Methods 
 
Sample 
 
Interviews were conducted with owners or managers of businesses in three socio-
economically different "Chinatowns" in the Manhattan, Queens, and Brooklyn boroughs of 
New York City.3 We constructed a sample of 888 businesses from the Chinese Business 
Guide and Directory, 1990, and adopted a multistage cluster sampling strategy to ensure 
adequate representation of 10 types of Chinese-owned businesses.4 Businesses uniquely 
vulnerable to extortion attempts were oversampled. In view of the difficulty of approaching 
respondents, and because of concerns about interviewers' safety, we excluded locations in the 
sex (massage parlor) and gambling industries. Thus the estimates of extortion activities were 
limited to businesses engaged in legal enterprises. 
 Response rates were high; 580 of the 888 subjects (65.3%) completed the interview. 
The refusal rate was 11.0 percent (98). The remainder (23.6%) were not interviewed because 
they could not be found. Some business had moved or closed (93). For others the address was 
wrong (27) or the owner was not Chinese (38).5 In some cases, the business could not be 
reached by telephone (52). When these cases were excluded from the original sample, 580 of 
the 678 remaining subjects (85.5%) were counted as interviewed. 
 To supplement the relatively small number of business owners from Brooklyn's 
Chinatown in the original sample, an additional 23 business owners in that area were 
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interviewed. Interviewers went door-to-door along Eighth Avenue in Brooklyn and 
interviewed owners whose business fit the 10 categories selected for the study.6 The final 
sample thus included 603 businesses. 
 Most respondents were well-educated young Cantonese men from Hong Kong who 
had lived in the United States for about 10 years. The businesses were mostly restaurants or 
retail food or nonfood stores located in the Manhattan and Queens Chinatowns, and were 
relatively new. Interviewers classified most businesses as small or medium-sized on the basis 
of their physical size and self-reported volume of activity. Table 1 shows the respondents' 
personal and business characteristics. 
 The data also showed that the Manhattan and Brooklyn Chinatowns were dominated 
by businessmen from Hong Kong, whereas merchants from Taiwan were most active in 
Queens and in mid- or upper Manhattan. Respondents from China, the newest group, tended 
to congregate in areas ofBrooklyn outside Chinatown. In comparison with subjects from 
Hong Kong and China, business owners from Taiwan were better educated and spoke better 
English. Owners of restaurants and supply firms were less well educated than owners of 
professional offices. Factory and supply businesses were located mostly in Manhattan's 
Chinatown, whereas professional offices were situated mostly in Queens' Chinatown. Female 
respondents were involved predominantly in service-oriented businesses or the garment 
industry. 
 
Data collection 
 
To initiate contact with the interviewee, we sent a bilingual letter to the respondent's business 
address. The letter described the purpose of the study, how the business had been chosen, the 
confidentiality of the study, and the voluntary nature of participation. It also stated that a 
US$20 stipend would be paid upon completion of the interview. To reassure business owners 
of the legitimacy of the study, a bilingual letter signed by the director of the sponsoring 
agency (the National Institute of Justice) was included with the notification letter. After the 
letters were mailed, interviewers contacted business owners by telephone, reminding them of 
the letter and asking for an appointment for an interview. 
 Six of the seven interviewers were female college students or social workers. They 
read the questions aloud to the respondents and encouraged them to respond in their own 
words. Responses were recorded in Chinese and were summarized later by bilingual analysts. 
The interviews took place from April to September 1990. 
 Gang victimization was measured for each of the four types of gang exploitation of 
businesses: protection, extortion, forced sale of goods, and theft of goods or services. The 
prevalence, frequency, and amount of payment for each type were recorded, as was any 
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violence associated with each of these dimensions. Respondents also were asked to recount 
the patterns of typical encounters with gangs and their 
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Table 1. Respondents' Personal and Business Characteristics (N=603) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Personal  Business   
     
Sex No. % Type of Business No. %
Male 472 78.3 Restaurant 211 35.0
Female 131 21.7 Retail food store 101  16.7
  Retail nonfood store 95 15.8
  Professional office 33 5.5
Age  Service 69 11.4
Mean 43 Wholesale/retail supply 46 7.6
Median 42 Garment factory 37 6.1
Mode 41 Other 11 1.8
     
Country of origin   
Location 
  
Hong Kong 324 53.8 Manhattan's Chinatown 335 55.6
Taiwan 104  17.3 Queens' Chinatown 129 21.4
China 85 14.1 Brooklyn's Chinatown 42 7.0
Other 89 14.8 Outside Chinatown 97 16.1
     
Ethnicity  Age of firm  
Cantonese 332 55.8 Mean  8 
Fukienese 44 7.4 Median  5 
Chiu Chao/ 
Hakka 
29 4.9 Mode  3 
Taiwanese 44 7.4    
Shanghainese 45 7.6 Size of firm  
Other Chinese 73 12.3 Very small 55 9.3
Other 28 4.7 Small  172 29.1
  Medium  253 42.8
  Large  111 18.8
     
Education  Sole owner of business? 
No formal 
schooling 
8 1.3 Yes  283 48.1
6th grade or less 55 9.3 No  305 51.9
7th to 9th grade 68 11.5    
10th to 12th grade 198 33.4    
College 230 38.8    
Graduate school 34 5.7    
     
Number of Years 
in US 
 Also own the property?  
Mean 16 Yes  80 13.6
Median 14 No  508 86.4
Mode 10    
___________________________________________________________________________ 
reactions to gang extortion (see Chin et al. 1993 for further information on sampling design 
and research procedures of this study). 
 
Validity and reliability 
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The measurement of gang victimization appeared to have high face validity and reliability. 
The interviewers were asked to rate the subjects' honesty and memory; interviewers' ratings 
thus provided assessments of the respondents' honesty in answering the questions. The 
interviewers reported that most subjects were either "very honest" or "honest" in their 
accounts of their victimization and appeared to have a clear recall of specific events and 
interactions. According to the interviewers, many owners kept records of extortion payments 
or received a receipt from the gang members for each payment. These records or receipts 
help the owners to keep track of their payments and (for the purpose of this study) their 
victimization. Because few merchants report gang intimidation to the police, and because 
only victims who are heavily extorted or physically assaulted are likely to contact law 
enforcement authorities, the police do not maintain any systematic data on gang extortion in 
the Chinese community. Accordingly it is almost impossible to cross-validate self-reports of 
victimization with official statistics. 
 We computed reliability (Cronbach's alpha) for each of the three dimensions of 
victimization: prevalence, frequency, and monetary costs. For each dimension, we calculated 
the coefficients for reliability among the four types of extortion. The coefficients were 
satisfactory: .697 for prevalence of victimization, .601 for frequency, and .633 for monetary 
costs. 
 
Results 
 
Seriousness of gang victimization 
 
Seriousness of gang extortion is measured by the prevalence and annual incidence of gang 
extortion, economic loss due to victimization by gangs, and use of threats by gang members 
against victims. Forced sales were reported to be the most prevalent type (51.1% attempted 
and 40.8% completed), followed by extortion, theft of goods or services, and protection (see 
Table 2). Overall, approximately seven subjects in 10 (69%) had been approached by gang 
members, and slightly more than one in two (54.7%) had been victimized. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Seriousness of Gang Extortion in New York City's Chinese 
Communities (N=603) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Type of Extortion 
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 Protect-ion Extortion Forced sales Theft of 
goods or 
services 
All types 
      
Lifetime prevalence      
Attempted 21.6 40.8 51.1 17.1 69.0 
Completed 11.6 26.5 40.8 15.7 54.7 
      
Annual incidence      
Mean 14 5 2 17 10 
Median 12 3 2 7 3 
Mode 12 1 1 3 1 
Maximum 52 52 12 104 145 
      
Costs per incident (US$)      
Mean 129 76 51 119  
Median 65 30 40 45  
Mode 100 20 50 30  
Maximum 1,000 1,300 200 3,000  
      
Threats      
Did they threaten you? 33.8 19.1 9.8   16.7  
What type of threat?      
Threaten to disrupt business 15.7 11.4 4.1 4.3  
Threaten to damage property 8.6 7.0 1.6 2.1  
Reprisal from gang leader 7.1 2.5 1.2 4.3  
Threaten with violence 8.6 5.7 1.6 2.1  
Threaten to hurt your family 1.4 0.6 0.4 1.1  
Show weapon 1.4 1.3 0.8 0  
Other threats 12.9 3.8 3.3 6.4  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2 also shows that the annual incidence of gang victimization varies by type of crime. 
Merchants paid protection money an average of 14 times a year; most paid monthly. 
Extortion money was paid substantially less often than protection money. Although forced 
sales were the most prevalent type of gang extortion, most businesses were asked to buy 
items only once or twice a year. Theft of goods or services was the second most frequent type 
of victimization. 
 Table 2 further illustrates the economic loss per incident. On the average, the victims 
paid US$129 each time for protection, US$76 for extortion, US$51 for forced sales, and lost 
US$119 worth of goods or services whenever gang members refused to pay. Overall, victims 
lost an average of about US$615 a year as a result of gang extortion. 
 Only two subjects reported having been physically assaulted by gang members. In 
comparison, according to the 1980 National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), one 
robbery victim in three was assaulted (Karmen 1984). Chinese gang members tend to use 
verbal threats rather than physical violence to coerce business owners (see Table 2). 
Merchants were most likely to be threatened by gang members when they were approached 
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for protection money and least likely to be threatened when gang members came to sell 
items. Even when subjects were threatened, warnings were rarely directed against them or 
their families. More often than not, offenders harassed the owners with threats against their 
property or businesses. Weapons rarely were shown to the victims when threats were made 
(see Chin et al. 1992 for further information on the seriousness of Chinese gang extortion). 
 In sum, the prevalence of gang victimization appears to be relatively high among 
Chinese business owners, even though it is lower than the police estimate. Although most 
victims are exploited no more than three or four times a year, attempts at victimization are 
more frequent. Monetary loss due to gang extortion is less severe than suggested by law 
enforcement authorities (see, for example, Bresler 1981; Posner 1988). Victims rarely were 
threatened by gang offenders; when threats were made, no weapons were displayed. 
 
Justifications for complying with gang demands 
 
Most subjects (72%) cooperated when they were approached by gang members. Victims 
offered many reasons for conceding to gang demands. The first rationale is socio-cultural; 
some business people construed extortion demands not as criminal per se but as consistent 
with Chinese customs and social traditions. So long as gang members made claims during 
Chinese holidays and behaved deferentially, many merchants seemed willing to comply. 
When asked why they paid the gangs, victims often cited the following reasons: 
 
When they asked for money, they didn't physically attack me. Besides, they were very polite. This [asking for 
money by gang members] is expected in Chinatown. Nothing unusual. 
 
It was Chinese New Year, and it is a tradition to give lucky money during the New Year. For Chinese, it is quite 
natural and normal. If they came other time, then it is something else. 
 
It's [gang extortion] part of doing business, period. 
 
 When gang members come to sell items on Chinese New Year, it is culturally almost 
impossible for merchants to refuse. For Chinese business owners, "harmony" is a prerequisite 
for prosperity. That is, without harmony there will be no prosperity. To refuse a request from 
a well-wisher during Chinese holidays, even if the person is a gang member, is to disrupt 
harmony at the beginning of a year, and this might bring bad luck throughout the coming 
year. Besides, Chinese merchants believe that everybody is entitled to make a little extra 
money during the New Year. Under these assumptions, when gang members appeared with 
tangerines7 and said "Happy New Year; we wish you prosperity," the owners would rather 
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give out US$50 to US$100 than refuse to accept somebody's "goodwill." 
 Giving money to the gangs is also rationalized by the business owners as "reciprocal 
face-giving behavior." Among the Chinese, people are expected to know how to "give face" 
to other people, especially to those who deserve it or are in a position to demand it. Not 
giving face to a person, especially in response to an overt request, is a serious humiliation to 
the person who expects it. When face is given, the person who receives it should reciprocate. 
Gang members normally demand to be given face. Some owners, knowing the rule, may take 
the initiative and offer the gang members a discount without their asking. In this manner the 
owners express their understanding of jo yan, "how to behave like a person." In return, gang 
members are supposed to be more "reasonable" in dealing with their victims. 
 Other merchants were willing to pay because they saw payment as a practical way to 
deal with the problem. They realized that the police could not protect them or their business 
24 hours a day, and they believed that if they refused to pay the gang, the gang might damage 
their property or disrupt their business. They calculated the costs and benefits of not paying 
and concluded that in the long run, it might be cheaper to pay. The following reasons were 
mentioned often by merchants who viewed their compliance with gang demands as a prudent 
decision: 
 
I paid because I am afraid of their retaliation. I own a small business.   
  
I cannot afford to pay for any damage to the store. 
 
I was afraid they will come and sit in the restaurant if I refuse to pay. If that happened, customers will afraid to 
come into my restaurant. 
 
Can't fight directly with the gang, otherwise, can't do business because we are easy targets. 
 
 A third reason for giving in to gang members' demands rested on superstition or 
folklore. Many Chinese people follow the folkloric custom of "converting big problems into 
small problems, and small problems into no problems." According to this saying, no one 
should create a big problem out of a small problem. Others believe that disaster in life is 
inevitable for everybody, but that money can be spent to prevent the disaster. Many owners 
see the gangs as potentially disastrous to them and their businesses, so they are willing to 
spend a small amount of money to send them away. The following views, expressed by some 
merchants, exemplify Chinese people's unique feelings about the relationship between money 
and disaster: 
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Losing some money helps avoid misfortune. 
 
Spend some money to avoid bigger trouble. 
 
 For Chinese store owners, the opening ceremony of their businesses is symbolically 
important because they believe that the first day of business dictates the future. Everything 
must go smoothly at the opening celebration, they assume, to ensure a good future. If 
something goes wrong, it implies bad luck. Consequently, Chinese merchants are careful in 
picking the day for the occasion; some even consult a fortune teller to choose the right day. 
For this reason, Chinese merchants are most vulnerable during the opening ceremony. If gang 
members appear and congratulate the owners, the owners are unlikely to refuse a demand for 
money. They regard the payment as a way to generate "luck"; the money paid is known as lai 
si, money that is "good for the business." 
 
Resistance and avoidance 
 
Chinese business owners offered relatively little resistance to gangs. Only 86 of 306 
proprietors who had been approached by the gangs said they had not been victimized. In 
comparison, according to the NCVS data, the victim took some self-protective measure in 
slightly more than one-half (51%) of all personal victimizations (Hindelang et al. 1978). 
Chinese business owners were least likely to refuse gang demands for free food or services 
(4%), followed by forced sales (20%), extortion (34%), and protection (46%). The 
respondents may have been most reluctant to succumb to gang demands for protection money 
because in the case of protection, unlike other types of victimization, once the victim agrees 
to pay the gang, he or she may have to pay regularly for a long time. 
 Merchants reported many reasons for refusing to be victimized by gangs. Some 
respondents willingly gave gang members money during major Chinese holidays but 
persistently refused to be exploited if gang members approached them at other times. A 43-
year-old proprietor from Hong Kong expressed his feelings about being asked for money 
during the Christmas holiday: 
 
When these gang members came during Chinese New Year, I always paid them lai si [lucky money]. This is our 
custom, that's fine. However, when they showed up for money during Christmas, I told them, "This is not 
Chinese holiday, come back on Chinese New Year." Also, when these kids came to sell firecrackers and 
mooncakes on Chinese festivals, I normally bought them. Once they came to sell turkey on Thanksgiving and I 
said, "This is not our holiday, I am not celebrating. You have to wait until Chinese New Year." They left 
without a word. 
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 Other business owners refused the gang because they believed that once they 
conceded, systematic exploitation would become the norm. A 45-year-old Taiwanese store 
owner in Flushing, Queens told one of our interviewer why he was determined to fight 
against the gang: 
 
A group of gang members came for extortion money. They showed up three times, but I refused. I even called 
the police. At one time, a couple of police officers were inside my store, but the gang members still came in and 
said, "You got to pay us, you should know that there are three guns pointing at you from the outside." They 
dared to do that because they knew the police didn't understand Cantonese. I didn't want to pay because I know 
that there is no end to this once you start paying. The third time they were here, the police arrested them. 
 
 Most store owners who refused to pay were more subtle in their rejections than the 
Taiwanese respondent quoted above. Many business owners simply told the offenders that 
the owner was not in the store, and asked them to come back later. If gang members came to 
sell items, an owner might tell them that they had already bought the items and would show 
them the tangerines, firecrackers, or mooncakes that were placed in the store for that purpose. 
 Some store owners offered gang members food and drink instead of money. A 58-
year-old woman who owned a small store in Manhattan's Chinatown explained how she 
always tried to cajole the perpetrators with smooth talk and soft drinks when they came for 
money: 
 
I can't speak English and I don't have the time to seek help from the police. On the other hand, I can't afford to 
pay them whenever they come and say, "Auntie, one of our brothers just got out of jail, we need money to eat." 
What am I suppose to do? What I did was, I always asked them to sit down and take a rest, say nice things like 
"Big Brother, have a bottle of bean milk." They drank the milk, hung around for a while, and left. I saw this as a 
way to send away the win san.8 They also came to sell a tangerine plant during Chinese New Year. I pointed at 
the entrance to the basement and said, "Big Brother, we already got the plant right there." They left. You can't 
be outright blunt in dealing with these youngsters, you know. 
 
 Some merchants declined the gangs' demands because they were irritated by gang 
practices. They regarded themselves as law-abiding, hard-working business owners who had 
nothing to fear, and viewed gang members as a bunch of parasitic street thugs who prey only 
on those who do not dare to stand up to them. A 45-year-old woman from Hong Kong told us 
how she refused to pay protection money to a group of teenagers: 
 
Members of the XX gang showed up and asked for $300 a month for protection. I replied, "I can't pay you this 
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kind of money. Business competition is fierce here, I am barely surviving." They threatened to disrupt my 
business and hurt me. I said, "Look, I am not going to pay no matter what. You guys are so young, why don't 
you go to school or find a job?" Two of them appeared to be upset, but the rest of them didn't say a word. They 
left me alone. 
 
 Some merchants resisted because they were active or former members of a gang or 
tong.9 One store owner in his early thirties, who acted as if he were part of the gang 
subculture, claimed that he was not intimidated at all by gang members: 
 
A group of XX came and wanted extortion money from me. I said, "No money, get lost right away." They left 
the store immediately. They should have figured out who I was before they approach me for money. I am 
amazed that they had the guts to come before they even know anything about me. These XX are all garbage. 
 
 A tong member who owned a store in Manhattan's Chinatown was approached by a 
gang for protection money. The owner, a 63-year-old man, was quite bold in dealing with the 
gang: 
 
A clique of gang members asked me for protection money. I said "no" to them and they threatened me. "We'll 
burn your store and kill you," they said. I told them, "Do what you have to do; I'm waiting for you, anytime!" 
These guys thought that everybody in Chinatown was afraid of them. The more you pay them, the more you are 
afraid of them, the more they harass you. I've been in Chinatown for so many years, I've experienced every 
circumstance you can imagine; I'm not afraid of them. In fact, if they act arrogantly, I'll call the police and arrest 
them. If they are polite and humble, I may let them survive. 
 
 In examining the association between a merchant's personal and business 
characteristics and the likelihood of his or her resistance to gang demands, we found that 
variables associated with resistance were not the same for all forms of extortion. In 
comparison with business owners in Manhattan's or Queens' Chinatowns, merchants in 
Brooklyn's Chinatown were significantly more likely to resist when gang members 
approached them for protection money. Younger business owners were more likely to resist 
than older merchants when gang members asked for extortion money. Also, people who 
speak English fluently were less likely to comply with extortion. People who owned the 
building where the business was located also were more likely to resist extortion. Food retail 
stores and garment factories were more likely to resist buying items from the gangs than were 
other businesses such as restaurants and wholesale supply firms. Finally, merchants who had 
lived in the United States longer were more likely to resist than those who had arrived here 
more recently. 
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 Overall, restaurants were least likely to resist gang extortion; factories were most 
resistant. The more highly educated business people were more likely to resist than the less 
well-educated merchants. The use or absence of threats by gang members was not associated 
with store owners' resistance. 
 
Reporting crime to the police 
 
Law enforcement authorities often have attributed the pervasiveness of Chinese gang 
extortion to Chinese victims' reluctance to report crime (Kinkead 1992; US Senate 1992). 
Table 3 shows the report rate by type of victimization. Only 4.2 percent of the victims 
reported forced sales from gang members. When respondents were approached for protection 
money, they were more likely to contact the police (24%). The overall reporting rate among 
victims of Chinese gang extortion (21.6%) was substantially lower than the reporting rate for 
all personal crimes (37.7%) and for robbery (50.1%) as disclosed in the 1990 NCVS report 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 1992).10 Chinese store owners, however, were more likely to 
report robbery (73%) and burglary (84%) to the police than were the NCVS respondents 
(50% and 51% respectively). Because the NCVS data do not include the reporting rate for 
extortion, it is not known whether Chinese victims are less likely than members of other 
ethnic groups to report extortion. Nevertheless, a comparison with the 29.4 percent reporting 
rate of extortion among small business owners from various ethnic groups in Hawaii (Hawaii 
Crime Commission 1980) suggests that the Chinese merchants were not significantly less 
likely than others to approach law enforcement authorities when they were extorted. 
Therefore this study does not support the assumption that Chinese are the ethnic group least 
likely to report crime. 
 Why were so many Chinese business owners reluctant to contact the police when 
victimized? The police speculate that this is the case because the merchants, many of whom 
come from Asia, were exploited by law enforcement authorities in their own countries. As a 
result, they tend to distrust the police in the United States (US Senate 1992). Other observers 
believe that the language barrier is the main reason why Chinese victims avoid the police 
(President's Commission on Organized Crime 1984). Table 3 illustrates and compares the 
reasons given by respondents in this study and in the NCVS study on unwillingness to 
contact the police. 
 The major reason why the Chinese victims were unwilling to report was that they did 
not consider the crime important enough. Many business people were annoyed by the gang 
practices of asking for money or free food but did not view them as a serious threat because 
little money was lost or because they were not harmed or threatened by the offenders. This 
reason was rarely mentioned in the NCVS data. Chinese victims frequently gave the 
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following reason for not reporting: 
 
I paid them a small amount of money and they didn't hurt me. Besides, they 
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Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Reasons for Not Reporting Victimizations to the Police, by Type of 
Gang Victimization 
________________________________________________________________ 
 NCVS personal 
robbery 
Protect-ion Extortion  Forced sales Theft of 
goods and 
services 
      
Number of victims 1,149,710a 130 246 308 103 
Report rate 50.1 24.0 17.6 4.2 15.6 
Number of reasons stated for not 
reporting 
714,480 126 312 354 120 
Object recovered/offender 
unsuccessful 
19.4 13.4 12.5 5.4 - 
Lack of proof/insurance would 
not cover/unable to recover 
property 
14.0 15.8 21.8 17.5 21.7 
Police ineffective, inefficient, or 
biased 
11.3 8.7 6.7 1.4 5.8 
Private or personal matter 8.7 3.2 - - - 
Police would not want to be 
bothered 
8.3 3.9 7.7 3.4 0.8 
Fear of reprisal 7.1 20.6 5.8 5.6 19.2 
Too inconvenient or time-
consuming 
6.8 4.8 7.1 2.3 1.7 
Reported to another official 7.2 - - - - 
Not aware crime occurred until 
later 
1.4 - - - - 
Crime not important enough 0.9 23.4 28.2 29.3 34.2 
It's a way to generate luck - 1.6 3.8 0.8 - 
This is expected in Chinatown - 4.0 0.9 1.4 0.8 
Will report if happens often - 1.6 2.2 0.3 1.7 
I can handle it myself - - 2.2 3.9 11.7 
We need the items anyway - - - 3.4 - 
See it as gift giving - - - 9.3 - 
See it as ordinary sale - - - 9.0 - 
Other reasons 15.1 2.3 0.9 6.7 3.3 
________________________________________________________________ 
a. Number of victimizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
propose it in such a polite manner. This is expected in Chinatown, nothing extraordinary. 
 
 The second most frequently mentioned reason was "uselessness." Victims assumed it 
was useless to approach the police because there was no proof of crime, the loss was not 
covered by an insurance company, or the victims were convinced that the police would not 
recover the money or goods. This also was found in the 1990 NCVS study to be the second 
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most frequent reason for not reporting robbery to the police. 
 Fear of reprisal was quoted as the third major reason for not reporting gang 
victimization. Respondents were concerned that if they approached the police, gang members 
might return and harm them, damage their property, or disrupt their business. In the NCVS 
survey, this reason ranked only seventh. 
 Others did not report to the police because they did not pay the gang. They did not 
view the attempted extortion as a complete crime, and thus, saw no reason to contact the 
police. Also, many respondents thought extortion was not worth reporting because they 
believed the police did not consider gang extortion serious in comparison to violent and drug 
crimes. Some respondents also stated that contact with authorities did not necessarily result 
in police action. Even when the police arrived, they advised owners to comply with gang 
demands, or told them that the police could do nothing about it because there was no proof of 
criminal victimization. On most occasions, the police filed a report and told the owners to 
call when gang members approached again. 
 Contrary to speculation by the police, no respondent mentioned distrust of the police 
as a basis for not reporting gang extortion. Language barrier, another frequently offered 
reason for non-reporting of crime by Chinese, also was not a factor. Thus the current police 
programs, which aim to improve the relationship between the police and community 
residents (as in monthly meetings between senior police officers and business owners) and to 
cross the language barrier (as with a bilingual police hot line) may not be the most efficient 
ways to enhance crime reporting among Chinese victims. Rather, programs are needed to 
educate Chinese victims about the social significance and policy implications of gang 
extortion and to assure them that their cooperation with law enforcement authorities will not 
result in reprisal by gangs. 
 Table 4 shows the reasons given by Chinese victims and NCVS respondents for 
reporting victimization to the police. Victims of gang extortion approached law enforcement 
authorities mainly because they wanted to prevent the offenders from committing further 
crimes against them, to stop or prevent gang extortion, or to improve police surveillance.11 
Unlike NCVS subjects, Chinese victims were motivated neither by the recovery of property 
nor by the conviction that extortion is a crime for which the authorities need to be notified. 
Yet when asked why they notified the police when their businesses were robbed or 
burglarized, most respondents replied that these were serious crimes which must be reported. 
Table 4 illustrates that Chinese business owners and NCVS subjects appear to have 
significantly different reasons for reporting victimization to law enforcement authorities. 
 Associations between crime-reporting behavior and merchants' personal and business 
characteristics are presented in Table 5. One of the most accurate predictors for reporting 
crime is the offender's use of intimidation or threats when demanding money. The data 
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suggest that if victims were threatened, regardless of the form or the seriousness of the 
offense, they were more likely to contact the authorities. In cases of protection, merchants 
born in Taiwan were most likely to report; Hong Kong-born respondents were least likely. 
When owners of large businesses (those with branches) were approached by gang members 
for extortion money, they were more likely to report than small business owners. 
 The last column on Table 5 indicates the association between store owners' personal 
and business characteristics and overall crime-reporting behavior. It shows that Chinese 
merchants who speak fluent English reported at a higher rate than those who speak little 
English. Also, respondents who operate businesses outside the Chinese communities were 
more likely to report than store owners within the Chinese communities. Among the three 
Chinese communities, merchants in Manhattan's Chinatown were least likely to contact 
authorities. In sum, the data suggest that situational (threat) and social (neighborhood) factors 
are more accurate indicators of crime-reporting behavior among  
 
 
Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Reasons for Reporting Victimizations to the Police, by Type of 
Victimization 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 NCVS 
personal 
robbery 
Overall gang 
extortion 
Robbery Burglary 
     
Number of reasons stated for 
reporting 
531,890 105 46 67 
To recover property 17.9 - - - 
To catch or find offender 14.4 9.5 4.4 7.5 
Because it was a crime 12.7 3.8 - - 
To prevent further crimes by 
offender against victim 
10.2 23.8 - - 
To punish offender 9.5 0.9 - - 
To prevent crime by offender 
against anyone 
9.3 0.9 2.2 - 
To stop or prevent this incident 8.2 20.0 - - 
Duty to notify police 6.9 3.8 - 1.5 
To improve police surveillance 2.5 17.1 30.4 25.3 
Needed help because of injury 1.4 - - - 
To collect insurance 0.7 - 4.3 7.5 
Good relationship with police - 5.7 - - 
Being threatened - 3.8 - - 
A serious crime; must be 
reported 
- - 54.3 38.8 
To have a police record - - 4.3 13.4 
Some other reason 5.9 9.5 - 6.0 
Not available 0.6 - - - 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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Chinese business owners than personal characteristics (education and English proficiency). 
 
Reducing risks 
 
 Respondents were asked whether they changed their lifestyles, altered their business 
practices, or increased their business security measures because of gang harassment. Twenty-
two percent of the respondents stated that they changed their lifestyles. The adjustments 
mentioned most often included dressing in ordinary clothes, not wearing jewelry, carrying 
little money, and driving inexpensive automobiles. In short, the common strategy was to 
maintain a low profile and to avoid being noticed as a business owner. 
 Twenty-nine percent of the respondents said they altered their business practices to 
avoid being victimized by gangs. These practices included closing stores earlier than usual, 
hiring only acquaintances or friends, keeping only a small amount of cash in the store, and 
doing business only with regular customers. 
 Almost six respondents in 10 revealed that they increased business security measures 
for crime prevention. Many owners installed alarm systems, video cameras, or iron gates on 
their business premises. In order to discourage gang members with beepers from hanging 
around, some stores removed public phones. To avoid the possibility of gang members' 
robbing customers in restrooms, the owners locked the restrooms or remodeled them so they 
could not hold more than one occupant at a time. 
 Other measures adopted by the store owners were (1) to hire only workers who spoke 
fluent English. When gang members came, the workers were instructed to communicate with 
gang members only in English, thus deterring offenders; (2) to hire managers who could deal 
with gang members; (3) to leave the business premises in a group at closing time; (4) to carry 
guns; and (5) to hire non-Chinese employees. 
 In sum, many Chinese merchants changed their lifestyles and business practices or 
increased their security measures because of the gang problem. Many respondents were 
reluctant to discuss what they did because they did not want outsiders to know what risk 
management tactics they used. After all, some of the adjusted behaviors might not be viewed 
as socially desirable. For example, some merchants initiated contacts with tongs for 
protection. Under these circumstances, store owners might be obligated to donate a certain 
amount of money to the tongs as a membership fee. The tongs issue a receipt to the donor, 
and the receipt is posted at the business entrance as a deterrent to gangs. Tong membership or 
a receipt from a tong, however, was by no means a sure way to avoid gangs. Even some 
owners who joined the tongs or offered them money suffered extortion by gangs. 
 
 
22 CHIN KO-LIN 
Table 5. Personal and Business Characteristics, by Crime-Reporting Behavior (N=603) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 Type of extortiona 
 
 Protection Extortion Theft of goods 
or services 
All types 
     
Number of subjects being 
approached 
130 246 103 416 
     
Sex (%)     
Male 21.7 18.7 14.0 43.3 
Female 34.8 14.0 25.0 38.2 
     
Country of Birth (%)     
Hong Kong 4.3** 17.2 12.5 36.0 
Taiwan 57.1 19.2 16.7 50.0 
China 25.0 17.7 17.5 43.5 
Other 18.8 17.2 11.8 38.8 
     
Education (%)     
Low 12.5 7.9 11.8 36.2 
Middle 22.7 15.1 21.4 38.6 
High 29.5 23.7 11.9 47.9 
     
English Proficiency (%)    
Not at all 0.0 14.3 0.0 19.0* 
Not very proficient 20.6 6.3 12.5 32.6 
Somewhat proficient 28.3 18.1 16.7 47.8 
Very proficient 25.0 22.7 18.9 45.2 
     
Type of Business (%)     
Restaurant 24.5 21.7 18.3 50.6 
Retail food 22.2 8.9 8.3 41.1 
Retail nonfood 15.0 22.6 17.6 33.3 
Office & service 50.0 10.0 14.3 35.7 
Wholesale & other 14.3 16.7 0.0 34.2 
Factory 33.3 23.1 none 29.4 
     
 
Neighborhood (%)     
Manhattan's Chinatown 23.9 13.0 14.5 34.9** 
Queens' Chinatown 22.7 23.8 14.8 50.0 
Brooklyn's Chinatown 18.8 14.3 25.0 37.5 
Other Manhattan 33.3 33.3 none 53.8 
Other Queens 33.1 25.0 none 75.0 
Other Brooklyn 27.3 27.8 20.0 64.0 
     
Any Branches? (%)     
Yes 22.9 28.6* 20.0 46.7 
No 24.5 15.1 14.6 41.1 
 
Were You Threatened? (%)    
Yes 35.7* 34.0*** 20.0 65.9*** 
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No 17.4 13.9 13.4 35.6 
________________________________________________________________ 
a. Data on forced sales are not presented because only 13 subjects (4.2%) reported the crime to the police. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
 
 The data show no appreciable differences between victims' and nonvictims' reactions 
to the gang problem in the Chinese community. Respondents in Brooklyn's Chinatown, 
however, were more likely to alter their lifestyles than merchants in other areas. Business 
owners in the core area of Manhattan's Chinatown were less likely to adjust their lifestyles in 
the face of gang threats. Respondents in Queens' and Brooklyn's Chinatowns were more 
vigilant and more cautious than merchants in Manhattan's Chinatown. Business owners 
outside the three Chinese communities were more likely to do something to protect 
themselves from the gangs. Even within Manhattan's Chinatown, however, business people 
on the outskirts of the community were more circumspect than those in the core areas, where 
the tongs exert tighter control. Perhaps the merchants in the core area of Manhattan's 
Chinatown realized that in a close-knit community, where personal identity and wealth are 
difficult to conceal, there is not much they can do about the situation. Also, business owners 
inside the tongs' territories were less concerned about being hurt or threatened by local gang 
members with whom they were familiar. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Chinese merchants can be categorized according to their reaction to gang extortion. Those 
who comply with the gangs include four basic groups. The first, the "weak," pay the asking 
price almost every time to almost anybody. Very few people belong to this group because 
most business owners do not pay on every occasion, or they barter and negotiate with the 
gangs. The second group, the "smart," pay only reputed gang members, but do not pay every 
time and certainly do not pay the asking price. The third category, the "wise," engage in a 
dialogue with gang leaders before the business opens and pay a lump sum once and for all. 
They negotiate the "rules of the game" with gang leaders; if the rules are violated by young 
gang members, they speak directly to the leaders. The fourth group, the "invisible," consists 
of owners who are known to few people. These operators may delegate responsibility to a 
manager with possible gang ties, and the manager deals with the gang by himself. 
 Merchants who are not victimized also may be categorized into four groups. The 
"forgotten" are small business owners who operate their businesses at a considerable distance 
from the community, or locate in obscure places at the outskirts of the community and have 
little cash flow and light customer traffic. As a result, these store owners are very unlikely to 
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be noticed by gangs. The second group, the "players," distract gangs with dodges and 
subterfuges. They are seldom on the business premises; they close their stores on major 
holidays; they repeatedly delay payments; they plead for mercy when gang members demand 
immediate payment. They are always smiling and seem very patient, but they avoid 
shakedowns. The "bullies" bluntly reject the gangs; they are not concerned about gang 
reprisals because they are determined to fight back if reprisals should occur. Finally, the 
"own" are powerful community leaders or former gang members who know the gangs well 
and can instill fear based on their reputation. They can make remarks such as "They [the 
gangs] should feel lucky if I don't bother them." 
 In general, if a businessman is too soft and too pliable, he might be heavily 
victimized; on the other hand, if he is too tough, the gang members may feel offended and 
may be challenged to act out their threats. The trick is to avoid paying the gangs without 
offending them. The merchant also needs powerful tong members to vouch for him if he is 
approached by the gangs. In sum, being in business in Chinatown requires a repertoire of 
skills and connections that go beyond mere commercial talent. One also must be a 
psychologist and a politician in order to cope with constraints and problems in the business 
environment. Not every business owner, however, possesses the resources, determination, or 
presence of mind to survive or neutralize the gang threat. 
 After careful examination of the quantitative and qualitative data collected for this 
study, we find that gang extortion in the Chinese communities is both institutionalized and 
normalized. Institutionalization occurs when certain behavioral patterns are integrated into 
the social routines and customs and are expected by individuals, groups, and organizations in 
a specific community. That is, gang extortion in the Chinese community has become so 
common and so pervasive that residents, business owners, community leaders, law 
enforcement authorities, and various community associations have come to take it for 
granted. Many Chinese business people stated that they have become so accustomed to being 
approached for money that they now view it as part of doing business in their communities. 
Some owners revealed that after discussing the gang issue with their business partners before 
a grand-opening ceremony, they and their partners decided to put aside a certain amount of 
money as a gang offering. 
 The tongs and other community associations are fully aware of the gang extortion 
problem in the community. Yet, leaders of these organizations say that it has existed for a 
long time and there is little they can do about it. In fact, many community associations have 
benefited indirectly by the threat of gang extortion because some owners either "donate" 
money to these associations or maintain a good relationship with their officers, believing that 
this will provide protection. In other words, the vulnerability of Chinese business people to 
gang victimization somehow legitimizes the status of certain community associations and 
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their leaders. 
 Gang victimization of business owners is not only institutionalized but also 
normalized or regularized. That is, certain local norms shape the behavior of gang members; 
they tend to follow these norms ritualistically when they approach merchants for money. The 
norms concern the amount of money to be requested; the demeanor to be displayed by gang 
members; and the timing and frequency of extortion attempts. As long as gang members 
adhere to these norms, their activities fit the pattern of acceptable behavior not only from the 
victims' standpoint but also from the standpoint of the law enforcement community and 
certain powerful community leaders. The latter are in position to punish gang members 
whose extortion activities are not regularized. 
                                                 
Notes 
*. Support for this research was provided by grant 89-IJ-CX-0021 from the National 
Institute of Justice. The opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the official positions or policies of the US Department of Justice. The 
author wishes to thank Jeffrey Fagan and Robert Kelly for their invaluable help in 
conducting this research. Correspondence may be sent to the author at the Department 
of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, University 
Heights, Hill Hall, Newark, NJ 07102, USA.  
1. Chinese business owners made a distinction between "extortion" and "protection," 
whereas the New York State Penal Code does not. 
2. Demanding money or the provision of goods and services to avoid violence or 
harassment is the working definition of extortion adopted in this study. Chinese gangs 
use different methods to extort, but all involve the use of threats of violence or 
mayhem to illegally obtain money, services, and other property of value. 
3. The Chinatown in Manhattan is a well-established social and commercial center. It 
is located on the lower east side of Manhattan and is surrounded by City Hall, "Little 
Italy," and the East River. Approximately 80,000 persons now live there; the 
population is growing quite rapidly as a result of China's open-door policy and the 
political instability in Hong Kong. Residents are mostly working-class Cantonese-
speaking immigrants from China or Hong Kong (Kwong 1987; Zhou 1992). The 
Chinatown in Queens is located in the Flushing section, where thousands of Chinese 
have settled along Main Street and the No. 7 subway route through Jackson Heights 
and Elmhurst. Residents are predominantly new immigrants from Taiwan or Korea 
(Chen 1992). Brooklyn's Chinatown is situated along Eighth Avenue in the Sunset 
Park section and in neighboring Bay Ridge and Borough Park. It is connected to 
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Manhattan's Chinatown by the N and B subway trains, which serve as social and 
economic lifelines between the two communities (Smith 1988).  
4. More than 5,000 predominantly Chinese-owned businesses were listed in the 1990 
edition of the Directory. The 10 types of businesses included in this study were: 
restaurant, retail food store, retail nonfood store, professional office, service, 
wholesale/retail supply, garment factory, entertainment, vocational training, and 
cultural recreation. In the Directory, 4,290 firms were listed under these business 
categories for Manhattan, Queens, and Brooklyn. 
5. We intended to interview only Chinese business owners, assuming that Chinese 
gangs victimize only Chinese businesses. After the sample was drawn, we tried to 
exclude businesses that were apparently non-Chinese firms or known to be owned by 
non-Chinese. Even so, we encountered several businesses that we learned were non-
Chinese only after we arrived for the interview. As a result, a number of non-Chinese 
firms were included in the sample. 
6. This study initially planned to interview about 50 subjects from Brooklyn's 
Chinatown. Because Chinatown's commercial center is relatively small (not more 
than several blocks along Eighth Avenue), only about 100 firms from the area were 
listed in the Directory. As a result, only 36 businesses in Brooklyn's Chinatown were 
included in the original target sample. Of these 36 firms, 19 were interviewed. We 
decided to supplement the original sample with stores located in the area that were 
not included in the original sample. The interviewers were instructed to approach one 
of the 10 types of businesses selected for the study. Eventually, we included 23 
additional stores in Brooklyn's Chinatown in the sample. A comparison between 
sampled and nonsampled businesses in Brooklyn's Chinatown reveals no difference in 
subjects' characteristics, such as age, sex, country of origin, length of residence in the 
United States, English proficiency, and educational level. Also, we found no 
difference in business characteristics, such as the type of business, age of the firm, 
and size of the firm. 
7. Tangerine is called kat in Cantonese and kyi in Mandarin, which are synonymous to 
the pronunciation of the word "luck" in Chinese. Tangerine trees are one of the major 
items of decoration for Chinese during the Chinese New Year. 
8. Most Chinese gods or spiritual figures are considered to be friendly and bring good 
fortune to people. However, there is a small number of ferocious gods who symbolize 
disasters. These gods are generally known as win san. One way to deal with these 
gods is to offer them food and ask them to go away. 
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9. Tongs were established as self-help groups by the first wave of Chinese immigrants 
in the United States during the mid-nineteenth century (Dillon 1962). Vicious group 
conflicts among the tongs are known as "tong wars" (Gong and Grant 1930). 
Historically, the tongs have been very active in operating or providing protection for 
opium dens, gambling places, and brothels in Chinese communities in the United 
States (US Senate 1978). The tongs have thousands of adult members, predominantly 
male, from all walks of life, but very few are involved in criminal activities. Most 
well-established Chinese gangs in New York City are affiliated with one or more 
tongs (Chin 1990b). 
10. The crime reporting rate between NCVS data and this study are not entirely 
compatible. The NCVS asked respondents whether they reported their victimizations  
in 1990 to the police. This study asked Chinese business owners whether they had 
ever reported gang extortion to law enforcement authorities. The reporting rate for 
Chinese victims could be lower if the time frame were limited to one year. 
11. Chinese victims appeared to be aware that if the gangs were not stopped, they 
would have to be paying money to them for a long period of time. As a result, they 
have a strong desire to stop this before it becomes a regular victimization. 
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